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The Legal Boundaries for
Impartiality of IDEA Hearing
Officers: An Update
Perry A. Zirkel
Special education has become a significant area of
litigation in the K-12 school context.1 The primary reasons
include: (1) the highly prescriptive and detailed
requirements of the Individuals with Disabilities Act
(“IDEA”)2 and its regulations,3 and (2) its user-friendly right
of private action via an “impartial due process hearing,” 4
with the state option of a review officer tier5 and the ultimate
right of judicial appeal.6
As a result, the impartial hearing officer (“IHO”) is
the fulcrum of this adjudicative process under the IDEA.7
1

E.g., Perry A. Zirkel & Brent L. Johnson, The "Explosion" in Education
Litigation: An Updated Analysis, 265 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2011) (revealing the
upward trajectory of IDEA litigation within the relatively level trend of K–12
litigation within the past three decades).
2
20 U.S.C. §§ 1401–1419 (2019).
3
34 C.F.R. §§ 300.1–300.537 (2020).
4
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f); 34 C.F.R. § 300.511(b). The number of states opting for
a review officer tier has decreased from twenty-six in 1991 to eight in 2019.
Jennifer F. Connolly et al., State Due Process Hearing Systems under the IDEA:
An Update, 30 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 156, 157–58 (2019) (identifying
Kansas, Kentucky, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, and South
Carolina); see also Lisa Lukasik, Special-Education Litigation: An Empirical
Analysis of North Carolina’s First Tier, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 735, 745 n.38
(2016) (identifying Oklahoma as an additional state with a review officer tier).
5
20 U.S.C. § 1415(g); 34 C.F.R. § 300.514(b).
6
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2); 34 C.F.R. § 300.516. For the IDEA exhaustion
provision, see 20 U.S.C. § 1414(l); Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743
(2017) (requiring exhaustion of claims that are based on the IDEA obligation
of providing a “free appropriate public education” (“FAPE”)).
7
The IDEA also provides for an alternative decisional dispute resolution
process at the administrative level that is investigative rather than adjudicative.
E.g., Perry A. Zirkel, State Laws and Guidance for Complaint Procedures
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However, the IDEA only provides for the two standards for
impartiality, stating that “at a minimum” IHOs shall not be:
“(I) an employee of the State educational agency or the local
educational agency involved in the education or care of the
child; or (II) a person having a personal or professional
interest that conflicts with the person's objectivity in the
hearing.” 8 The first of these two standards is a per se
prohibition, whereas the second one is an ad hoc conflict-ofinterest standard depending on the specific situational
circumstances.9
The framework of remaining standards are left—via
the IDEA’s structure of “cooperative federalism”10—to state
laws.11 Ultimately, the courts serve as the chief cartographer
for the legal boundaries of IDEA IHO impartiality in their
interpretation, gap-filling, and application of the federal and
under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 368 EDUC. L. REP. 24
(2019); Perry A. Zirkel, The Two Dispute Decisional Processes under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: An Empirical Comparison, 16
CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 169 (2017); Perry A. Zirkel, A Comparison of the IDEA’s
Dispute Resolution Complaint Procedures and Due Process Hearings, 326
EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2016).
8
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(a)(i)(I)–(II)
9
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(a)(i)(I)–(II)
10
E.g., Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Kain, 485 F.3d 730, 733–34 (2d Cir.
2007) (quoting Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 52 (2005));
Evans v. Evans, 818 F. Supp. 1215, 1223 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (recognizing that
states may add requirements to the IDEA’s foundation).
11
E.g., Perry A. Zirkel, State Laws for Due Process Hearings under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 38 J. NAT’L ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY
3, 17 (2019); see also Andrew Lee & Perry A. Zirkel, State Laws for Due
Process Hearings under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act III: The
Prehearing Stage, 40 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY (forthcoming
spring 2021) (canvassing recusal provisions). For the limited additional
impartiality requirements for review officers under the IDEA, see e.g., N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 279.1(c) (2018). For the separable role of
codes of conduct for administrative law judges to the extent that they are not
incorporated in state (or federal) laws, see generally Ronnie A. Yoder, The Role
of Administrative Law Judge, 22 J. NAT’L ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 321 (2002).
For an example of a customized code of conduct and related procedural forms
for IDEA IHOs, see e.g., PENNSYLVANIA SPECIAL EDUCATION DISPUTE
RESOLUTION MANUAL 57 (2017), available at www.odr-pa.org (including a
prefatory clarification of not having the force of law).
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state framework.12 Unlike the “thin” impartiality standard
often associated with public school student disciplinary
hearings, 13 the primary competing analogies are the
appearance of bias approach that generally applies to
judges14 and the less strict approach that is closer to actual
bias and that generally applies—due to their small close-knit
context—to labor arbitrators.15
Previous Research
As reviewed in the springboard synthesis for this
update, 16 the previous research relating at least in part to
IDEA IHO impartiality is notably limited in date, location,
and focus.17 Only two prior analyses were comprehensive
12
The secondary sources are the decisions of review officers in the dwindling
number of two-tier jurisdictions (supra note 4) and the policy interpretations of
the administering agencies for the IDEA and, to a limited extent within its
overlap with the IDEA, Section 504 (infra note 16).
13
John M. Malotunik, Beyond Actual Bias: A Fuller Approach to Impartiality
in School Exclusion Cases, CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 112, 115 (2018)
(characterizing the prevailing standards in such cases as “thin” and advocating
a thicker approach that approximates appearance of bias).
14
E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2017).
15
E.g., Perry A. Zirkel & Peter Winebrake, Legal Boundaries of Partiality and
Misconduct of Labor Arbitrators, 1992 DET. C.L. REV. 679, 685–86 (1992)
(citing the intermediate standard in Morelite Constr. Co. v. N.T.C. Dist. Council
Carpenters Benefits Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 88 (2d Cir. 1984)).
16
Peter J. Maher & Perry A. Zirkel, Impartiality of Hearing and Review
Officers under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: A Checklist of
the Legal Boundaries, 83 N. DAKOTA L. REV. 109, 111–14 (2007).
17
E.g., Martin Diebold & Robert Simpson, An Investigation of the Effect of Due
Process Hearing Officer on Placement Decisions, 11 DIAGNOSTIQUE 69, 74
(1986) (finding that occupational background of IHOs in Alabama did not
appear to affect their placement decisions); James Newcomer, Perry A. Zirkel,
& Ralph Tarola, Characteristics and Outcomes of Special Education Hearing
and Review Officer Cases, 123 EDUC. L. REP. 449, 453–56 (1998) (finding a
significant difference in outcomes between Pennsylvania IHOs with and those
without experience in education); Geoffrey F. Schultz & Joseph R. McKinney,
Special Education Due Process: Hearing Officer Background and Case
Variable Effects on Decisions Outcomes, 2000 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 17, 24 (2000)
(finding in a midwestern state that settlement rates were higher for IHOs who
were attorneys than for those who were not attorneys); Ann P. Turnbull, Bonnie
Strickland, & H. Rutherford Turnbull, Due Process Hearing Officers:
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in primary legal sources and exclusively focused on IHO
impartiality.18 In the first, which dates back to 1993, Drager
and Zirkel divided the relevant sources, including court
decisions and agency policy interpretations, 19 into two
categories—"structural,” including per se, and “situational”
bias.20 In the structural category, they found that courts and
agencies had established the subsequently codified21 per se
prohibition against state education agency (“SEA”) and local
education agency (“LEA”) employees from serving as either
IHOs or, in two-tier states, review officers (“RO”s).22 At the
situational level, they concluded that courts and agencies
gravitated more toward an actual bias than an appearance of
bias approach.23
Next, in the predecessor of the present analysis,
Maher and Zirkel synthesized the cumulative court decisions,

Characteristics, Needs, and Appointment Criteria, 48 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 48,
51 (1981) (finding in a survey of North Carolina district personnel who were
responsible for appointing IHOs that the respondents' primary criterion for
determining impartiality was the IHO's ability to be objective, regardless of
prior school district experience).
18
Elaine A. Drager & Perry A. Zirkel, Impartiality Under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, 86 EDUC. L. REP. 11 (1993); Maher & Zirkel, supra
note 16.
19
Drager & Zirkel, supra note 18, at 21–22, 35. The relevant agencies are parts
of the U.S. Department of Education: (1) the Office of Special Education and
Rehabilitation Services (OSERS) and its subsidiary that administers the
IDEA—the Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP), and (2) the Office
for Civil Rights (OCR), which administers Section 504 and the Americans with
Disabilities
Act
in
the
K–12
context.
See
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/or/index.html.
20
Drager & Zirkel, supra note 18, at 14–17.
21
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
22
Drager & Zirkel, supra note 18, at 20–24. However, the cited case law largely
arose from the approach for administrative adjudicators generally rather than
IDEA IHOs specifically, such as Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d
983, 998 (1st Cir. 1990) (applying standard of “actual bias or hostility,” citing
cases arising from state agency adjudications not tied to special education or
another particular administrative sub-area).
See supra note 4 and
accompanying text.
23
Drager & Zirkel, supra note 18, at 29.
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RO decisions, 24 and federal agency interpretations as of
2007 into a checklist template. 25 More specifically, their
template consisted of a table that (a) in its rows identified
various more specific categories within the overall Drager
and Zirkel framework that had arisen in this cumulative body
of law, such as employment, occupation, relationship, and
conduct, and (b) in its rows placed an entry for each column,
footnoting the supporting sources, within a four-part
continuum ranging from “clearly impartial” to “clearly
biased.”26 They found that the majority of the entries were
in the “presumptively impartial” category, although it was
not entirely clear whether the basis for the classification was
the underlying approach or the ultimate outcome.27 In any
event, the only cited instances of an outcome adverse to the
IHOs or ROs impartiality were in either the per se categories
of SEA or LEA employment28 or the presumptively biased
category of ex parte communications. 29 Overall, they
concluded that for the various situational categories the

24
Although of clearly less legal weight than IHO decisions, review officer
decisions more frequently address the impartiality issue of the first tier. Maher
& Zirkel, supra note 16, at 122. Moreover, at the time of the Maher and Zirkel
analysis, the number of two-tier states, although notably decreased from the
Drager and Zirkel analysis, still accounted for approximately a third of the states.
Id.
25
Supra note 18. They also pointed out that state laws added more specific
standards, although only identifying two examples. Maher & Zirkel, supra note
16, at 110 n.11, 115–19, 120 n.62.
26
Maher & Zirkel, supra note 16, at 115–19. Their table provide a parallel but
differentiated set of entries for IHOs and ROs, respectively, in light of the still
notable frequency of states with and sources specific to a second tier. See supra
note 24.
27
Maher & Zirkel, supra note 16, at 116–17 nn.36, 41. For instance, they listed
various contractual-relationship situations in the “clearly biased” category, but
the cited agency interpretations and case law used the per se employment
categories only as a reference point for an ad hoc approach that had an adverse
outcome in these particular situations. Id.
28
Id. at 115 nn.32–33.
29
Id. at 116 n.43 (citing Hollenback v. Bd. of Educ., 699 F. Supp. 658, 668–69
(N.D. Ill. 1988); Murphy v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 460 A.2d 398, 401 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1983)).
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judicial appearance-of-bias standard was not applicable, 30
and instead, the prevailing approach was deferential.31 Their
recommendations included (1) development of a customized
approach, (2) IDEA regulatory requirements for disclosure,
and (3) state law expansion of the per se categories and
appointment procedures that remove or counterbalance
district participation.32
I.

PURPOSE AND METHOD
The purpose of this article is to provide an update of
the Maher and Zirkel case law analysis, with limited
appropriate adjustments. More specifically, the template
remains the same except for two adjustments: (1) based on
the limited remaining number of two-tier jurisdictions and
the similarly reduced applicable case law specific to the
second tier, the focus is on IHOs with the limited citations
specific to review officers integrated into the footnotes for
the entries in each row;33 and (2) for differentiation from the
original version, the new item content is italicized and the

30

Id. at 120. However, rather than the customized approach that they
recommended based on the small community of special education, the cited
court decision, which is one of the few analyses that specifically addressed the
issue, relied on the aforementioned “actual bias, hostility or prejudgment”
approach derived from more general administrative adjudications. Falmouth
Sch. Comm. v. Mr. & Mrs. B., 106 F. Supp. 2d 69, 73 (D. Me. 2000) (citing
Dell v. Bd. of Educ., 32 F.3d 1053, 1064–66 (7th Cir. 1994); Roland M. v.
Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 997–98 (1st Cir. 1990)).
31
Maher & Zirkel, supra note 16, at 120. “With the exception of the items that
clearly violate statutory and regulatory prohibitions, the prevailing rationale
appears to be to defer to the impartiality of the [IHO or RO].” Id.
32
Id. at 121–22.
33
Connolly et al., supra note 4, at 157–58; Lukasik, supra note 4, at 745 n.38;
Maher & Zirkel, supra note 16, at 115–19; Perry A. Zirkel, State Laws for Due
Process Hearings Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act II: The
Post-Hearing Stage, 40 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1, 3 n.9 (2020);
see supra note 27.
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prior entries are listed in small parentheticals.34
The data collection was from two overlapping
electronic
databases:
Westlaw
and
LRP’s
SpecialEdConnection®, 35 and the selection was limited to
the period January 1, 200736 to September 1, 2020.37 The
Boolean search included variations of not only “impartiality,”
but the obverse or overlapping terms of “bias,”
“disqualification,” and “recusal” in connection with the
“Individuals with Disabilities Education Act” and “hearing
officer.” Clarifying the boundaries for selection among the
resulting rulings, the exclusions were for (a) impartiality
cases resolved on grounds other than the merits;38 (b) cases
in which the impartiality issue was only incidental and
34
The parenthetical entries are only approximations due to the aforementioned
imprecision and the elimination of the separate set of RO items. Maher & Zirkel,
supra note 16, at 116–17 nn.36, 41; see supra note 27 and accompanying text.
35
This specialized database includes not only court decisions but also agency
interpretations as well as IHO and RO decisions in the context of the IDEA and
Section 504. The citations to this source are to “IDELR” or for what
approximately corresponds to WL citations, “LRP.”
36
The starting date was based on the approximate ending of Maher and Zirkel’s
coverage. The limited sources that they identified in 2007 were excluded herein.
Maher & Zirkel, supra note 16, at 109–22.
37
The final check for the selection “data” was October 1, 2020, thus leaving
only a limited possibility of the belated publication of additional relevant cases
decided prior to September 1, 2020.
38
E.g., R.R. v. Scarsdale Union Free Sch. Dist., 366 F. App’x 239 (2d Cir.
2010); Horen v. Bd. of Educ., 655 F. Supp. 2d 794 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (waiver);
H.H. v. Ind. Bd. of Special Educ. Appeals, 50 IDELR ¶ 34 (N.D. Ind. 2008)
(dismissed as systemic claim not part of original complaint); J.N. v. S.W. Sch.
Dist., 55 F. Supp. 3d 589 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (admission of supplementary
evidence concerning alleged bias); H.C. v. Katonah-Lewisboro Union Free Sch.
Dist., 59 IDELR ¶ 108 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d on other grounds, 528 F. App’x
64 (2d Cir. 2013) (inadmissible evidence, as part of the line of cases re New
York’s RO); B.D. v. District of Columbia, 77 IDELR ¶ 124 (D.D.C. 2020); D.T.
v. Sumner Cnty. Sch., 75 IDELR ¶ 224 (M.D. Tenn. 2019); Donahue v. Kan.
Bd. of Educ., 75 IDELR ¶ 12 (D. Kan. 2019); Avaras v. Clarkstown Cent. Sch.
Dist., 75 IDELR ¶ 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); R.S. v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 899 F.
Supp. 2d 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); H.A. v. Teaneck Bd. of Educ., 54 IDELR ¶ 98
(D.N.J. 2010) (subject to or subordinated within exhaustion); Haw. Dep’t of
Educ. v. Zachary B., 52 IDELR ¶ 213 (D. Haw. Dec. 31, 2009) (subsumed
within remedial delegation).
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unspecific;39 and (c) impartiality cases in which the IHO or
RO was responding to a motion for recusal rather than it
being a subject of review by a higher adjudicative level.40
Thus, the included cases started at the RO level.41 Finally,
the scope was limited to impartiality, not the overlapping but
separable issue of competence,42 of IHOs.43
II.

FINDINGS
The following table provides the resulting updated
checklist, with due differentiation from the findings for the
prior period for a more complete and comparative
overview:44

39

E.g., M.G. v. Williamson Cnty. Sch., 720 F. App’x 280, 284 n.3 (6th Cir.
2018); Doe v. Attleboro Pub. Sch., 960 F. Supp. 2d 286, 296 n.5 (D. Mass. 2013)
(tangential mention without sufficiently specific nature of claim); In re Student
with a Disability, 115 LRP 27798 (N.Y. SEA 2015) (general conclusory
allegations).
40
E.g., Harford Cnty. Pub. Sch. 117 LRP 23626 (Md. SEA 2016); Duxbury Pub.
Sch., 108 LRP 64293 (Mass. SEA 2008) (IHO recusal rulings); Bd. of Educ. of
Mex. Acad., 107 LRP 64195 (N.Y. SEA 2007) (RO recusal ruling).
41
“SEA” in the parenthetical for a case citation herein designates a decision at
the IHO or RO level.
42
For the competence criteria, the most recent amendments of the IDEA added
directly after the aforementioned impartiality standards, see 20 U.S.C. §
1415(f)(3)(A)(ii)–(iv).
43
For cases that addressed both issues, the coverage here was limited to the
ruling specific to impartiality. E.g., A.M. v. District of Columbia, 933 F. Supp.
2d 193, 207 (D.D.C. 2013) (ruling that IHO’s efficient management of the
hearing for timeliness did not violate impartiality, with intertwined treatment of
competence issue).
44
For the original version, representing the prior period, see Maher & Zirkel,
supra note 16, at 115–19. Here, the italicized items in column 1 are additions,
and the small parenthetical entries in the other columns are for the prior period.
See supra text accompanying note 34 and accompanying text.
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Table: Overview of Updated Case Law Specific to IHO
Impartiality

Clearly
Impartial

Presumptively
Impartial

Presumptively
Biased

Clearly
Biased

Employment
Board
member,
chief officer,
or other
employee
of the SEA
Board
member,
chief
officer,
or other
employee
of the party
LEA
Board
member,
chief
officer, or
other
employee
of another
LEA

✓45(✓)

✓46(✓)

✓47(✓)

45
Letter to Chester, 52 IDELR ¶ 106 (OSERS 2009) (interpreting IDEA regs
as clearly prohibiting IHOs from being SEA employees and suggesting
acceptable alternatives for the inquiring state to have them serve as separate
state employees).
46
Greendale (WI) Sch. Dist., 65 IDELR ¶ 155 (OCR 2014); Matthews Cnty.
(VA) Pub. Sch., 114 LRP 42768 (OCR 2014); Norwalk (CT) Pub. Sch., 108
LRP 21708 (OCR 2007); Ferguson-Florissant (MO) R-II Sch. Dist., 108 LRP
42444 (OCR 2007) (for district’s § 504 hearings—usually via confusion with
504 grievance procedure).
47
C.E. v. Chappaqua Cent. Sch. Dist., 695 F. App’x 621, 624–25 (2d Cir. 2017)
(finding the former superintendent of another LEA years earlier was complying
with N.Y. regulation requiring at least a two-year gap).
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✓48

48
D.R. v. Dep’t of Educ., 827 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1167 (D. Haw. 2011) (former
SEA employee).
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Occupation
private attorney for
LEA's law firm
private attorney who
represented other LEAs
and/or other parents
professor at a state college
or university
professor who participated
in state special education
policy formulation

(✓)
✓49(✓)

(✓)
(✓)

Relationships

✓50(✓)

continuing relationship
with SEA employee
prior contact with either
party or parties' attorney
continuing consulting
relationship with LEA
contractual relationship
with other LEAs

✓51(✓)

(✓)
✓52

Personal Characteristics
negligible connection of
family members

(✓)

49

SCO of Fam. Serv., 2017 LRP 43926 (N.Y. SEA 2017) (disclosed and
nonprejudicial).
50
J.S. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 69 IDELR ¶ 153 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (no evidence
of substantive involvement or effect); W.T. v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y.C. Sch. Dist.,
716 F. Supp. 2d 270 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (cohabitation of review officer with SEA
special education attorney).
51
Allyson B. v. Montgomery Cnty. Intermediate Unit No. 23, 54 IDELR ¶ 64
(E.D. Pa. 2010), aff’d, A.B. v. Montgomery Cnty. Intermediate Unit, 409 F.
App’x 602 (3d Cir. 2011) (party attorney formerly worked as fellow IHO—due
process>IHO manual); In re Student with a Disability, 113 LRP 16887 (N.Y.
SEA 2013) (unproven and no showing of actual bias, though recommending
disclosure).
52
In re Student with a Disability, 112 LRP 8925 (N.Y. SEA 2012) (although
disclosure would have been preferable).
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Performance or Product
prehearing conduct
prior decisions
ex parte communications
hearing conduct and/or

✓53
✓54(✓)
✓55
✓56(✓)

(✓)

53

Morrison v. Perry Sch. Dep’t, 2019 WL 3035283 (D. Me. July 11, 2019),
adopted, 2019 WL 3502879 (D. Me. Aug. 1, 2019) (prehearing motions); James
D. v. Bd. of Educ., 642 F. Supp. 2d 804, 819 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (denial of request
for neutral location—contrary to state law); E. Islip Union Free Sch. Dist., 119
LRP 4661 (N.Y. SEA 2018); In re Student with a Disability, 109 LRP 56226
(N.Y. SEA 2008) (broad-based challenge extending to hearing conduct and
decision preparation but including prehearing scheduling).
54
Cruz v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 74 IDELR ¶ 204 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (explaining
that legal errors in prior proceeding “rarely suffice”); Dep’t of Educ. v. Ria L.,
64 IDELR ¶ 236 (D. Haw. 2014) (prior rulings before remand were not
extrajudicial and, in any event, did not show appearance of bias); N.Y.C. Dep’t
of Educ., 119 LRP 4663 (N.Y. SEA 2019) (comments re prior decision for same
parties); In re Student with a Disability, 109 LRP 47584 (DODEA 2008)
(administrative rather than substantive matters without material effect); cf. K.I.
v. Durham Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 76 IDELR ¶ 287 (M.D.N.C. 2020) (in
context of exhaustion, prior adverse ruling on timing did not overcome
presumption of impartiality); Price v. Upper Darby Sch. Dist., 68 IDELR ¶ 214
(E.D. Pa. 2016) (no violation for failure to disclose superficial involvement with
prior case re same child, albeit referring to state appearance-of-impartiality
ethical standards for IDEA IHOs); R.S. v. Lakeland Sch. Dist., 56 IDELR ¶ 211
(S.D.N.Y. 2011); R.E. v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 785 F. Supp. 2d 28
(E.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d on other grounds, 694 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2012); TC v.
Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 777 F. Supp. 2d 577 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); C.G. v. New
York City Dep’t of Educ., 752 F. Supp. 2d 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); W.T. v. Bd.
of Educ. of N.Y.C. Sch. Dist., 716 F. Supp. 2d 270 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); J.N. v.
Pittsburgh City. Sch. Dist., 536 F. Supp. 2d 564 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (among line
of cases regarding box score statistics concerning review officer—insufficient
alone, as with judges generally).
55
James D. v. Bd. of Educ., 642 F. Supp. 2d 804, 820 (N.D. Ill. 2009)
(unproven); W.H. v. Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., 52 IDELR ¶ 258 (E.D. Cal. 2009)
(disclosed per state law and harmless effect); In re Student with a Disability,
109 LRP 47579 (DOD SEA 2008); In re Student with a Disability, 109 LRP
47584 (DOD SEA 2008) (rejected here as administrative rather than
substantive).
56
Johnson v. Bos. Pub. Sch., 906 F.3d 182 (1st Cir. 2018); Nickerson-Reti v.
Lexington Pub. Sch., 893 F. Supp. 2d 276 (D. Mass. 2012) (credibility
determinations); Doe v. Cape Elizabeth Sch. Dep’t., 382 F. Supp. 3d 83 (D. Me.
2019); D.S. v. Parsippany Troy Hills Bd. of Educ., 73 IDELR ¶ 143 (D.N.J.
2018); B.H. v. Joliet Sch. Dist. No. 86, 54 IDELR ¶ 121 (N.D. Ill. 2010); Wilson

268

https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol21/iss1/8

12

Zirkel: Impartiality of IDEA Hearing Officers
[Vol. 21: 259, 2021]

Impartiality of IDEA Hearing Officers
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

v. Colbert Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 2008 WL 11424188 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 17, 2008);
Slater v. Exeter-W. Greenwich Sch. Dist., 2007 WL 2067719 (D.R.I. July 16,
2007); N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 119 LRP 1582 (N.Y. SEA 2018); In re Student
with a Disability, 2018 LRP 50601 (N.Y. SEA 2018); In re Student with a
Disability, 2017 LRP 13921 (N.Y. SEA 2017) (disagreement with unfavorable
decision); Tehachapi Unified Sch. Dist. v. K.M., 2019 WL4735735 (E.D. Cal.
Sept. 28, 2018); In re Student with a Disability, 2015 LRP 51106 (N.Y. SEA
2015) (alleged undue weight to other side’s evidence in decision); Genn v. New
Haven Bd. of Educ., 219 F. Supp. 3d 296 (D. Conn. 2016) (curt comments to
parent side in response to their discourteous conduct—no prejudicial effect
shown); In re Student with a Disability, 118 LRP 50584 (N.Y. SEA 2018)
(incivility to both parties); A.M. v. District of Columbia., 933 F. Supp. 2d 193
(D.D.C. 2013) (curtailing off-point evidence and active>asleep); In re Student
with a Disability, 119 LRP 41379 (N.Y. SEA 2019) (familiarity with a
witness—disclosed and partial analogy to case law re judges); In re Student
with a Disability, 115 LRP 50231 (N.Y. SEA 2015); N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.,
107 LRP 53514 (N.Y. SEA 2007) (activist IHO—not contrary to state regs);
Sudbury Pub. Sch. v. Mass. Dep’t of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 762 F.
Supp. 2d 254 (D. Mass. 2010) (active questioning of witnesses); Bd. of Educ.
v. Risen, 61 IDELR ¶ 130 (N.D. Ill. 2013); M.N. v. Rolla Pub. Sch. Dist. 31,
59 IDELR ¶ 44 (W.D. Mo. 2012) (marginal within context of deference—
comments in management of hearing); Sch. Bd. of Norfolk v. Brown, 769 F.
Supp. 2d 928 (E.D. Va. 2010); S.A. v. Exeter Union Sch. Dist., 2010 WL
4942539 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2010) (marginal within context of deference—
active questioning of witnesses); J.C. v. New Fairfield Bd. of Educ., 56 IDELR
¶ 207 (D. Conn. 2011) (marginal as alternative to inapplicability of state APA—
both decision and nonprejudicial evidentiary determinations); Avila v. Spokane
Sch. Dist. No. 81, 71 IDELR ¶ 172 (E.D. Wash. 2018), aff’d on other grounds,
744 F. App’x 506 (9th Cir. 2019); J.S. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 69 IDELR ¶
153 (S.D.N.Y. 2017); E.S. v. Katonah-Lewisboro Sch. Dist., 742 F. Supp. 2d
417 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d on other grounds, 487 F. App’x 619 (2d Cir. 2012);
W.H. v. Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., 52 IDELR ¶ 258 (E.D. Cal. 2009); Potsdam
Cent. Sch. Dist., 117 LRP 13961 (N.Y. SEA 2017); In re Student with a
Disability, 115 LRP 20886 (N.Y. SEA 2015); In re Student with a Disability,
113 LRP 7510 (Okla. SEA 2011); Richmond Heights Local Sch. Dist., 116 LRP
31041 (Oh. SEA 2016); York Cnty. Sch. Dist. Three, 108 LRP 70128 (S.C. SEA
2007) (evidentiary determinations, including time constraints); Wanham v.
Everett Pub. Sch., 550 F. Supp. 2d 152, 159 (D. Mass. 2008); In re Student with
a Disability, 119 LRP 41383 (N.Y. SEA 2019); In re Student with a Disability,
119 LRP 36208 (N.Y. SEA 2019); N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 118 LRP 50597 (N.Y.
SEA 2018), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Soria v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.,
74 IDELR ¶ 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (conduct and decision); In re Student with a
Disability, 118 LRP 33995 (N.Y. SEA 2018); York Cnty. Sch. Dist. Three, 108
LRP 6769 (S.C. SEA 2008) (broad-based challenge to IHO conduct and
decision, such as curtailing evidence––broad state regs + harmless error); Akron
Bd. of Educ., 116 LRP 10766 (Oh. SEA 2015), aff’d on other grounds sub nom.
Barney v. Akron Bd. of Educ., 763 F. App’x 528 (6th Cir. 2019) (unproven
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decision content

System
internal consultation process
lack of parental participation
in selection
• participation by LEA

(✓)
(✓)

Miscellaneous
public disability-related
expression

✓57(✓)
✓58

Overall, the updated items and entries follow a similar
pattern to the previous iteration, with the presumption of
impartiality being the prevailing approach—with the
exception of the codified per se categories of SEA and LEA
employment. On successive levels of closer examination,
other, more specific findings emerge.
First, the entries for the more recent period, when
examined in tandem with the footnoted sources, reveal that
the per se employment prohibitions are limited to agency
reinforcement,59 whereas the bulk of the case law has shifted
to the performance and product area. More specifically,
although IHO relationships continue to be an area of
occasional litigation, 60 IHO conduct and decisions have
become the focal categories of impartiality challenges and
rulings.61
Second, the approach evident in these expanding
defamation of parent’s counsel). But cf. In re Student with a Disability, 119
LRP 36210 (N.Y. SEA 2019) (mistake and abuse of discretion but not sufficient
for bias); N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 118 LRP 50576 (N.Y. SEA 2018) (remanding
for new IHO based on abundance of caution).
57
Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Virtual Educ. Software, Inc., 111 LRP 65918 (Nev.
SEA 2011) (broad-based including payment of IHO fee).
58
Cf. Stengle v. Off. of Disp. Resol., 631 F.2d 564 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (rejected
First Amendment and § 504 claims of nonrenewed IHO who engaged in
disability advocacy via a blog—publicly perceived lack of impartiality).
59
Supra notes 45–46.
60
Supra notes 50–52 and accompanying entries.
61
Supra notes 53–56 and accompanying entries.
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areas of case law is a rather consistent presumption in favor
of the IHO’s impartiality.62 Examination of the cited cases
reveals that the presumption is usually tied to administrative
law judges rather than “traditional” judges.63 For example,
First Circuit courts have continued to apply the “actual bias
and hostility” and its intertwined “presumption of honesty
and integrity” approach, 64 which is applicable to
administrative adjudicators in general. 65 Courts in other
jurisdictions have similarly and expressly applied this
deferential approach. 66 Alternatively, other courts have
provided corresponding IHO latitude via an outcome-based
approach, whether via a two-step approach of procedural
FAPE under the IDEA, 67 or a more general approach of
prejudicial effect. 68 Overall, these prevailing variations
came much closer to an actual appearance of bias approach,
62

Supra notes 53–57 and accompanying entries.
The use of “traditional” in this context is not uncommon but only
approximate. E.g., Sherrod v. Birnbaum, 457 F. App’x 573, 575 (7th Cir. 2012);
Harrison v. Coffman, 35 F. Supp. 2d 722, 726 (E.D. Ark. 1999). Like the
corresponding use of “hidden” for administrative law judges, it is subject to
changing awareness over time. E.g., Yoder, supra note 11, at 323 (citing, inter
alia, Thomas C. Mans, Selecting the “Hidden Judiciary”: How the Merits
Process Works in Choosing Administrative Law Judges, 63 JUDICATURE 60
(1979)).
64
E.g., Johnson v. Bos. Pub. Sch., 906 F.3d 182, 193–94 (1st Cir. 2018);
Morrison v. Perry Sch. Dep’t, 2019 WL 3035283, 23 (D. Me. July 11, 2019),
adopted, 2019 WL 3502879 (D. Me. Aug. 1, 2019); Nickerson-Reti v.
Lexington Pub. Sch., 893 F. Supp. 2d 276, 288 (D. Mass. 2012).
65
For the precedent cited in these cases, see supra notes 22, 30.
66
E.g., A.M. v. District of Columbia, 933 F. Supp. 2d 193, 206 (D.D.C. 2013)
(“A hearing officer enjoys ‘a presumption of honesty and integrity, which is
only rebutted by a showing of some substantial countervailing reason to
conclude that a decisionmaker is actually biased,’” citing a D.C. Circuit
decision referring to administrative adjudications generally); M.N. v. Rolla Pub.
Sch. Dist. 31, 59 IDELR ¶ 44 (W.D. Mo. 2012) (“Administrative officers are
presumed to be unbiased,” citing an Eighth Circuit decision concerning federal
ALJs).
67
E.g., James D. v. Bd. of Educ., 642 F. Supp. 2d 804, 819 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (no
resulting FAPE effect on student or parents). For this two-step approach, see
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E) (2018).
68
E.g., Genn v. New Haven Bd. of Educ., 219 F. Supp. 3d 296, 311(D. Conn.
2016) (failure to show that the IHO’s conduct affected the case outcome).
63
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with the exceptions being almost negligible.69
Third, an examination of the footnoted case law
reveals that state law standards have played a role in a more
than negligible, but still rather limited number of the cases.70
Moreover, although the specific state law standard has been
outcome-determinative in the occasional case, 71 it has at
least as often been of non-controlling significance.72
At the final and perhaps most telling level, an
examination of the outcomes of the cited sources for this
2007–2020 period reveals that the various challenges to IHO
impartiality have almost entirely been unsuccessful, with the
limited exception of the agency determinations in the per se
employment category.73 Indeed, none of the second-tier and
court reviews has rendered a ruling of IHO impartiality.74
The closest to such a ruling were two recent New York RO
decisions.75 In the first of these decisions, the RO concluded
that “there is insufficient evidence on the record to
affirmatively establish bias on the part of the IHO.” 76
69

Cf. Dep’t of Educ. v. Ria L., 64 IDELR ¶ 236 (D. Haw. 2014) (default use of
appearance of bias); In re Student with a Disability, 119 LRP 41383 (N.Y. SEA
2019) (alternative use of actual and appearance of bias); In re Student with a
Disability, 119 LRP 41379 (N.Y. SEA 2019) (alternative use of judicial analogy
with due distinction).
70
Supra notes 55–58 and accompanying entries.
71
E.g., C.E. v. Chappaqua Cent. Sch. Dist., 695 F. App’x 621, 625 (2d Cir.
2017) (ruling that IHO, a former superintendent of another LEA earlier in his
career, complied with N.Y. regulation requiring at least two-year gap).
72
E.g., James D. v. Bd. of Educ., 642 F. Supp. 2d 804, 820 (N.D. Ill. 2009)
(ruling that IHO’s denial of request for neutral location, while contrary to state
law, raised “legitimate concerns,” but the parent failed to show that it denied
the child a FAPE or demonstrated bias).
73
Supra notes 45-46 and accompanying entries.
74
As a result, an RO’s repeated conclusion that “[a]llegations of hearing officer
bias and lack of impartiality are rarely successful” amounts to an overstatement
for the case law during the last several years. Richmond Heights Local Sch.
Dist., 116 LRP 31041, at 25 (Oh. SEA 2016); Akron Bd. of Educ., 116 LRP
10766, at 20 (Oh. SEA 2015), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Barney v. Akron
Bd. of Educ., 763 F. App’x 528 (6th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added).
75
In re Student with a Disability, 119 LRP 36210 (N.Y. SEA 2019); N.Y.C.
Dep’t of Educ., 118 LRP 50576 (N.Y. SEA 2018).
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However, in the absence in the record or in the decision of
an explanation for the IHO’s denial of recusal, the RO, “in
an abundance of caution,” remanded the case to another
IHO.77 In the subsequent decision, the RO concluded:
Here, although I have found that the IHO
should have taken into account the
scheduling of the impartial hearing and
abused his discretion in his evidentiary
rulings, the error did not create an
appearance of partiality in favor of the
district nor was there evidence of actual
bias on behalf of the IHO.78
However, as additional assurance, the RO accepted
additional evidence and modified the IHO’s decision to
remediate the error.79
Discussion
Impartiality is an inherently critical criterion for
hearing officers, as it is for traditional judges. However, two
countervailing interests merit consideration in formulating
and interpreting the applicable standards.
The first
countervailing interest is applicable to administrative law
judges and other such hearing officers in general. The
aforementioned 80 Falmouth court opinion insightfully
expressed this countervailing cluster of considerations as
follows:
[T]here
are
powerful
institutional
interests
in
making
post-decision
challenges to an adjudicator
the exception and not the rule.
76

N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 118 LRP 50576 (N.Y. SEA 2018), at *9–10.
Id. at *10.
78
In re Student with a Disability, 119 LRP 36210 (N.Y. SEA 2019), at *10.
79
Id. at 11.
80
Supra note 30.
77
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Each losing party searches for
every possible reason to
attack a negative decision,
and
issues
that
were
insignificant or evanescent
before the decision suddenly
and unfairly (to the other
party and the adjudicator)
become monumental.
An
“appellate” tribunal is seldom
in a good position to make the
necessary
factual
determination.
Discovery
presents its own dangers.
Unless a very high standard is
set for any disgruntled litigant
to be able to question an
adjudicator about his/her
personal affairs, fishing
expeditions on the subject
will be inevitable.81
The second countervailing consideration is missing
in the applicable case law to date—the specialized purpose
and nature of the IDEA. 82 As for its purpose, “[t]he
legislative history, statutory terms, and regulatory
framework of the IDEA [that] all emphasize promptness as
an indispensable element of the statutory scheme.”83 As for
81
Falmouth Sch. Comm. v. Mr. & Mrs. B., 106 F. Supp. 2d 69, 73 (D. Me.
2000).
82
See generally About IDEA, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, https://sites.ed.gov/idea/about-idea/#IDEAPurpose.
83
E.g., Amann v. Stow, 991 F.2d 929, 932 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing Spiegler v.
District of Columbia, 866 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Adler v. Educ. Dep’t of
State of N.Y., 760 F.2d 454 (2d Cir. 1985); Bow Sch. Dist. v. Quentin W., 750
F. Supp. 546 (D.N.H. 1990)). As a commonly cited example of this purpose,
the Act’s principal sponsor emphasized the importance of promptly completed
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its nature, the field of special education under the IDEA and
its corollary state laws entails a specialized subject matter
that is so narrowly practiced that state and local education
agency representatives, attorneys on both sides, and IHOs
often have occasion to interact beyond, not just within, the
hearing process. 84 Yet, the “judicialization” of IDEA
IHOs,85 which includes the gradual but steady increased use
of lawyers generally and administrative law judges (“ALJ”s)
more specifically,86 and the resulting trade-off of specialized
expertise,87 runs the risk of (1) prolongation of the hearing
process and (2) imposition of an insufficiently tailored
approach to impartiality.88
due process hearings. Dell v. Bd. of Educ., 32 F.3d 1053, 1060 (7th Cir. 1994);
Blackman v. District of Columbia, 277 F. Supp. 71, 80 n.8 (D.D.C. 2003)
(citing Senator Williams’ statement in the final Senate debate at 121 CONG.
REC. 37,416 (1975)).
84
This narrowly specialized field not only yields repeat players at IDEA
hearings but also informal and formal interactions at conferences and other
professional activities focused on special education law. Connolly et al., supra
note 4, at 161.
85
E.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Zorka Karanxha, & Anastasia D’Angelo, Creeping
Judicialization of Special Education Hearings: An Exploratory Study, 27 J.
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 27, 38–44 (2007) (finding a gradual
increase in varying objective indicators of legalization in the IHO decisions in
a single state).
86
Connolly et al., supra note 4, at 161 (finding a “judicialization trend” toward
legal background in place of special education background and toward full-time
ALJs rather than part-time IHOs). The shift to ALJs is often without careful
connection to and customization of the generic nature of state APA laws, thus
causing not only ambiguities to the extent of their application, particularly when
conflicting with state special education laws, but also disharmonies with the
particular spirit and nature of the IDEA.
87
A foundational pillar of judicial deference to IDEA IHOs is the presumption
that they, unlike courts, have particular expertise in this specialized field. E.g.,
T.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 810 F.3d 869, 875 (2d Cir. 2016); Doe v. E.
Lyme Bd. of Educ., 790 F.3d 440, 450 (3d Cir. 2015) (recognizing IHOs’
“specialized knowledge and experience”); L.M. v. Capistrano Unified Sch.
Dist., 462 F. App’x 745, 747 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing IHOs’ special “expertise”);
Lessard v. Lyndeborough Coop. Sch. Dist., 518 F.3d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 2008)
(relying on IHOs’ “specialized knowledge).
88
As a baseline for the time-consuming over-legalized approach, a legal scholar
on the eve of the passage of the IDEA, in the wake of experience with the
hearing process in Pennsylvania under PARC v. Commonwealth, 343 F. Supp.
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Instead, similar to the relatively small and
specialized context of labor arbitration, 89 a customized
approach that approximates actual, rather than appearance of,
bias continues to be un-realized but warranted for the
impartiality of IDEA IHOs.90 Courts that face impartiality
challenges and the corollary state laws under the IDEA need
to add this reinforcing customized consideration. More
specifically, because the structural areas of employment and
occupation are largely settled, 91 the priority for the
reinforcing customized approach is secondarily in the
continuing relationship subcategories,92 and primarily in the
expanding performance and product subcategories. 93 The
more general presumption of impartiality is in the
appropriate direction,94 but needs fine-tuning in light of the
specialized purpose and nature of the IDEA.95 Moreover,
279 (E.D. Pa. 1972), concluded that (1) dead-center impartiality was not the
appropriate standard, (2) IHOs should have professional expertise in special
education, and (3) “[t]he trick is to get a much efficiency as possible.” William
Buss, What Procedural Due Process Means to a School Psychologist, 13 J. SCH.
PSYCH. 278, 304–06 (1975). For similar scholarly early warnings against overproceduralization, see Zirkel, supra note 11, at 26 n.128 (citing David Kirp,
William Buss, & Peter Kuriloff, Legal Reform of Special Education: Empirical
Studies and Procedural Proposals, 62 CAL. L. REV. 40, 154 (1974); Maynard
C. Reynolds, More Process Than Is Due, 14 THEORY INTO PRAC. 61 (1975)).
The use of central panel ALJs and state APA laws, which are overlapping but
not coterminous for IDEA hearings, may each be appropriate policies on a stateby-state basis but only on a carefully harmonized with state special education
laws for net effectiveness of IHO hearings; see, e.g., Zirkel, supra note 33, at
23–24.
89
Supra text accompanying note 15.
90
For the earlier recommendation that the courts have yet to incorporate, see
supra text accompanying note 32.
91
Supra notes 45–49 and accompanying text.
92
Supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text.
93
Supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text.
94
Supra notes 73–79 and accompanying text. The outcomes pattern seems to
show an almost absolute presumption but it warrants moderation in light of the
possible skewing effect of prophylactic recusals. The specific extent of this
factor is unknown, as is the extent of the possible intervening effect of the
parties’ legal counsels’ disincentive to put impartiality in question for IHOs
whom they may face in future cases.
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the appearance of bias approach, which appears in some of
the applicable state laws,96 merits reallocation to ethical and
best-practice prophylaxis rather than a reversible
requirement for IDEA ALJs.97
This proposal for a customized standard is intended
to stimulate discussion, debate, and resulting legislative and
judicial refinements that provide latitude for carefully
considered state variation under the IDEA, including central
and specialized panels of ALJs.98 This consideration should
focus on the two successive areas of applicable legal activity
during this lengthy updated period.

95
Cf. P.M.B. v. Ridgefield Bd. of Educ., 944 F.3d 473, 477 (2d Cir. 2019)
(concluding that the Congressional intent for “expedient resolution of [IDEA]
claims” overrode applying the state APA legislation’s filing period for state
courts to federal court appeals of IHO decisions).
96
In addition to the three state laws identified in Zirkel, supra note 11, at 17
(Colorado, Iowa, and Maryland), others are Indiana, New Jersey, and
Tennessee. IND. CODE § 4-21.5-3-10 (2017) (listing in addition to various other
grounds for disqualification “any cause for which a judge of a court may be
disqualified”); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 1.1 App. (attaching Code of Conduct for
ALJs as appendix for APA regulations for Office of Administrative Law);
TENN. COMP. R & REGS. (2018) (incorporating canons 1–4 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct). The state laws of all of these states, except Iowa, are general
Administrative Procedures Act (APA) provisions for ALJs generally rather than
within the laws specific to the special education context. Moreover, even for
ALJs, the standards for traditional judges merit careful adjustment. For
example, pointing out that IHO impartiality overlaps with IHO independence,
Mayes observed that the administrative law judiciary generally is more
susceptible to external forces; see generally Thomas A. Mayes, Protecting the
Administrative Judiciary from External Pressures: A Call for Vigilance, 60
DRAKE L. REV. 827 (2012). For the independence interest associated with
central panel ALJs, see Malcolm C. Rich & Alison C. Goldstein, The Need for
a Central Panel Approach to Administrative Adjudication: Pros, Cons, and
Selected Practices, 39 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1 (2019).
97
Similarly, provisions for IHO training, evaluation and remediation, renewal,
or removal are a separate matter that should have more strict standards for
impartiality.
98
Approximately twenty states use central panels as IDEA IHOs, and three
additional jurisdictions—the D.C., Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania—have
separate specialized panels of ALJs for this purpose. Connolly et al., supra note
4, at 158.
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For the primary priority area of IHO performance
and product, various state law provisions make explicit what
is otherwise implicit under the IDEA—IHOs have the
authority as well as responsibility to manage the hearing
process actively so as fulfill the IDEA regulatory
requirement to issue the decision within 45 days of the
completion of the resolution process. 99 These provisions,
which predominate in the state laws within the specific
context of the IDEA, include limiting (1) testimony,100 (2)
extensions,101 and (3) hearing sessions.102 Thus, IHOs who
actively manage the hearing for prompt completion should
be protected from impartiality challenges except where the
complaining party proves a prejudicial effect, such as denial
of FAPE. 103 Conversely, state laws that provide for
inefficient selection or assignment,104 peremptory strikes,105
easy self-recusals, 106 formal recusal reviews, 107 or other

99
34 C.F.R. § 300.515 (requiring issuance of the decision within 45 calendar
days after expiration of the resolution period, with the limited exception of
“specific extensions . . . at the request of either party”). The resolution process,
which the 2004 amendments of the IDEA added, is a 30-day period designed to
facilitate settlement of the matter prior to the hearing. 20 U.S.C. §
1415(f)(1)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 300.510.
100
Zirkel, supra note 11, at 20 (Arkansas’ and Hawaii’s special education laws
as examples).
101
Id. at 21–22 (examples include Alaska’s, Arkansas’, Connecticut’s, and New
York’s special education laws).
102
Id. at 23 (examples include Arkansas’, New York’s, and Vermont’s special
education laws).
103
Cf. James D. v. Bd. of Educ., 642 F. Supp. 2d 804, 819 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (twostep procedural FAPE analysis for other, non-timing impartiality challenges).
104
Zirkel, supra note 11, at 19 (Montana’s ranking system).
105
Id. at 19–20 (five states, with Kansas being the most extreme). Moreover,
the possibility of the due process hearing complainant simply withdrawing the
complaint and filing another complaint within the limitations period as an “end
run” peremptory strike is a problem in states that use a rotational system rather
than assigning the same IHO to the case.
106
E.g., MONT. ADMIN R. 10.16.3509 (2017) (permitting withdrawal at any
point that the IHO perceives a personal or professional interest “might conflict
with the [IHO’s] objectivity”).
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more generic ALJ procedures and practices that do not
conform to the IDEA-specific primacy on promptness
should be adjusted or eliminated.108
For the secondary priority area of relationships, the
continuing direction of the applicable case law only needs
fine-tuned reinforcement in light of the inevitable frequent
contacts within the relatively small community. Disclosure
has a particularly prophylactic effect, although it is neither
an automatic cure-all nor an absolute prerequisite.109
Overall, this update shows that the impartiality of
IHOs under the IDEA merits further customization so as to
facilitate the prompt completion of the hearing process.110
This efficiency of dispute resolution under the IDEA is
essential for not only the individual interest child with
disabilities, for whom the window of opportunity for
learning is particularly important, but also the institutional
interests of local education agencies, for which funding is
limited and the priority is instruction. Finally, this broad but
well-tailored latitude is also in the intermediary interest of
IDEA IHOs, for whom integrity, independence, and
efficiency are essential.

107
E.g., LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 28, § 511 (2017) (department of administrative
law shall determine written challenge, with substitution of another IHO where
any doubt that first IHO is not “truly impartial”).
108
As a consequence of the increasing use of central panel ALJs (supra note
95), the majority of such laws are state APAs that warrant superseding careful
customization in the state’s corresponding special education law.
109
See supra notes 49, 51–52.
110
This IDEA customization applies generally to state law, not just judicially
developed, standards. E.g., Zirkel, supra note 11, at 25–27.
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